

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 043700
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/S:FGWISNER:TK
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
AF:WESCHAUFLE, JR.
S/S:RPERITO
P - - MR HABIB

-----272306 067809 /70

O R 272254Z FEB 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

S E C R E T STATE 043700

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, RH

SUBJECT: RELAUNCHING THE RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS: TALKING
POINTS FOR BOTHA

1. WE AGREED WITH THE BRITISH IN WASHINGTON FEBRUARY 24
THAT, SUBJECT TO MINISTERIAL APPROVAL, SCHAUFLE AND SIR
JOHN MORETON WILL TOGETHER REPLY TO THE LATEST SOUTH
AFRICAN SUGGESTIONS ON RHODESIA. AMBASSADORS SCOTT AND
BOWDLER WILL HOLD A SIMILAR TALK WITH FOURIE IN CAPE TOWN.
WE PROPOSE OUR REPLY TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINES WHICH YOU
SHOULD CLEAR WITH THE FCO, ASKING THEM THEN TO AUTHORIZE
MORETON TO JOIN SCHAUFLE IN MEETING AMBASSADOR BOTHA.
SCHAUFLE/MORETON TALKING POINTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

2.--WE AGREE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANALYSIS THAT
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NATIONALIST DISUNITY HAS BEEN AN OBSTACLE TO THE ACHIEVE-
MENT OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN RHODESIA. WE DO NOT,
HOWEVER, SEE A REFERENDUM OR A SIMILAR MECHANISM AT THIS
STAGE RESOLVING THE PROBLEM AND IT MAY IN FACT EXACERBATE
POLITICAL DIVISIONS AND FURTHER SEPARATE THE PARTIES WHICH
MUST REACH AN AGREEMENT.

3.--WE DO NOT SEE HOW THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS, WHO HAVE ALREADY ENDORSED THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WOULD BE ATTRACTED

TO A REFERENDUM CONDUCTED IN RHODESIA WHILE THE RHODESIAN FRONT STILL CONTROLS THE COUNTRY. NOR DO WE SEE HOW ALL THE NATIONALIST LEADERS, SOME OF WHOM LEAD GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS AND WHOSE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN RHODESIA, WOULD BE ABLE TO COMPETE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING IN AN ELECTORAL PROCESS. MOREOVER, ANY EFFORT NOW TO FORCE THE QUESTION OF NATIONALIST REPRESENTATION COULD UPSET THE DELICATE BALANCE THAT EXISTS ON THE SUBJECT AMONG OAU MEMBER STATES CAUSING THEM TO GIVE EVEN STRONGER SUPPORT TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THEREBY FURTHER EXCLUDING THE MODERATES.

4.--DESPITE OUR RESERVATIONS WITH THE PROPOSAL TO DESIGNATE A SINGLE NATIONALIST INTERLOCUTOR, WE ARE PREPARED TO RAISE THE ISSUE, AS BOTHA SUGGESTED, WITH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AND ASK THEM FOR THEIR VIEWS. IN PRESENTING THE IDEA, WE WILL UNDERLINE THE INTEREST ALL PARTIES HAVE IN AN OUTCOME WHICH AVOIDS FACTIONAL STRIFE.

5.--WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT SMITH'S SUGGESTION OF A REFERENDUM IS PREMATURE, WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE FURTHER THE REASONS BEHIND HIS IDEA. IF THE PROPOSAL FOR A REFERENDUM DOES INDEED INDICATE A NEW WILLINGNESS ON SMITH'S PART TO NEGOTIATE, WE BELIEVE IT IS THE BEST COURSE TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE DIRECTLY A SETTLEMENT. WE EMPHASIZE THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND NOT A REFERENDUM
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IS THE BEST WAY TO TEST SMITH'S SINCERITY IN TRANSFERRING POWER TO THE MAJORITY.

6.--WE WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER EFFORT THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD MAKE TO CLARIFY FOR US SMITH'S THOUGHTS AND INTENTIONS. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A) WHAT, FOR EXAMPLE, DOES HE MEAN BY MAJORITY RULE?

B) WHAT PROOF CAN HE OFFER THAT THERE WILL INDEED BE A GENUINE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE MAJORITY AND THAT HE AND THE RHODESIA FRONT WILL ACCEPT THE ULTIMATE TRANSFER OF POWER?

C) AS BOTHA HAS POINTED OUT, THE KEY TO A SETTLEMENT IS IRREVERSIBILITY, BUT WHAT PROPOSALS DOES SMITH HAVE IN MIND THAT WOULD GUARANTEE IRREVERSIBILITY?

D) DOES SMITH HAVE STEPS IN MIND WHICH WOULD INCREASE AFRICAN CONFIDENCE IN WHITE SINCERITY AND HELP CLEAR THE ATMOSPHERE OF SUSPICION?

7.--IN AN EFFORT TO SUSTAIN THE MOMENTUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WE ARE ABOUT TO DISCUSS WITH THE NATIONALISTS AND FRONT LINE LEADERS A SERIES OF PROPOSITIONS OR PRINCIPLES WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD UNDERLIE AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. BY DISCUSSING GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, IT IS OUR INTENTION TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND NARROW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS WHICH THE NATIONALISTS HAVE PRESENTED.

8.--THE PROPOSITIONS ARE GENERAL AND ARE A DISTILLATION OF PROPOSALS TABLED IN GENEVA AS WELL AS INCLUDING THE RECENT BRITISH PROPOSALS. TAKEN TOGETHER, HOWEVER, THEY
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MIGHT FORM THE BASIS FOR RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS AT A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE.

9---THE MAJORITY OF THE PROPOSITIONS ARE DRAWN FROM THE PROPOSALS WHICH RICHARD DISCUSSED DURING HIS MISSION IN AFRICA. WE UNDERSTAND YOU HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING THESE AS A BASIS FOR CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS.

10.--ONCE THE RESULTS OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AFRICAN PARTIES ARE CLEAR, WE WILL INFORM YOU.

11. IF ASKED, WE WILL GIVE BOTHA A COPY OF THE PROPOSITIONS BUT SAY THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE THE PROPOSITIONS TO SMITH UNTIL WE HAVE A CLEAR INDICATION OF HIS POSITION AND A SENSE OF HOW THE AFRICANS WILL REACT. WE WILL NOT UNDERTAKE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSITIONS WITH SMITH UNTIL WE HAVE CONSULTED FURTHER WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND HAVE OBTAINED THEIR VIEWS ON HOW TO PROCEED.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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APPROVED BY: AF/S:FGWISNER
S/S-O:SSTEINER
-----012304 100598 /63

O 012226Z MAR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 043700

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 043700 ACTION LONDON INFO
CAPE TOWN DTD 27 FEB

QTE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: GOVERNMENT REFORM, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 27-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3340096
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RELAUNCHING THE RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS: TALKING POINTS FOR BOTHA
TAGS: PFOR, PDEV, PGOV, RH, US, UK, SF
To: LONDON CAPE TOWN
Type: TE
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